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Chapter 5
Management of the
U.S. Navy Pension Fund

The management of the navy pension fund is of historical signiWcance
because it represents one of the earliest examples of a pension fund managed by the government. The unique character of this fund, including its
investment in private equities, provides a series of important parallels to
the contemporary debate concerning the management of employer pension and Social Security trust funds in the twenty-Wrst century. For this reason, the portfolio decisions of the trustees of the navy pension fund, the
responses of Congress to Xuctuations in the size of the fund and its perceived surpluses, and the response of Congress to investment outcomes are
examined in considerable detail.
As we noted in Chapter 4, during the Revolutionary War, the Continental
Congress began to provide disability pensions for military personnel. By the
1790s, navy pensions, like those for army veterans, were paid from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Additional legislation passed in 1799 and
1800 established an autonomous fund to support pension payments for
naval personnel. These payments were to be Wnanced by the sale of prizes.
After the claims of the crew and prize courts were honored, the residual
revenues from the sale of ships and/or contraband seized from enemy or
quarantined vessels were placed in the navy pension fund. Recall that a portion of the residual was reserved in a separate fund for privateer’s pensions
(see Chapter 4).
The 1799 legislation stated that the managers of the fund should invest
all monies in “six percent or other stock [that is to say, bonds] of the United
States, as a majority of them, from time to time, shall determine to be most
advantageous” (Seybert 1818).1 Legislation enacted in 1800 deWned the
eligibility for the receipt of a pension and its amount; created the administrative structure of the fund; and established the Secretaries of the Navy,
Treasury, and the War Department as the managers of the fund’s portfolio.
In fact, as we shall see below, the secretaries of the executive departments
were trustees, and the management of the fund was placed in the hands
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of their agents. In a signiWcant change in policy, the 1800 legislation also
authorized the commissioners to invest the funds “in any manner which
a majority of them might deem most advantageous” (Seybert 1818). This
change in their charge gave the secretaries complete freedom in managing
the fund’s portfolio, including the freedom to purchase private assets for
the fund. Within a decade, the trustees used this Xexibility to begin purchasing private equities for the pension fund.
This chapter reviews the history of the management and investment activities of the navy pension fund. The material includes a detailed review
of the assets held by the fund at year-end from 1800 until the dissolution of
the fund in 1842; a summary of the annual revenues and expenditures
of the fund is also included. Examination of the investment process including the payment of commissions to salaried agents, reinvestment of idle
cash balances, and some failures in obtaining dividend disbursements from
the private bank stock shows some of the problems associated with the purchase of private assets in a public pension fund. The next chapter discusses
the antebellum Wnancial markets in order to describe the assets that were
available to the fund and the general economic conditions affecting the
investment environment faced by the fund’s managers. The fund’s unique
experience with the purchase of private assets is then examined with special attention being given to the details of the fund’s investment in stock of
a particular Wrm—the Columbia Bank. Together these two chapters provide a unique perspective on today’s debate concerning the management
and structure of pension funds in the twenty-Wrst century, in particular the
reform of the Social Security system.

The Management of the Navy Pension Fund Portfolio
The trustees of the navy pension fund did not employ actuarial analysis to
project either the number of eligible beneWciaries or the expected costs of
future liabilities. Revenues were unpredictable and depended on the skill
and fortunes of U.S. seamen and the frequency and length and breadth of
international conXicts. As a result, both assets and liabilities Xuctuated with
national fortunes in war and peace. The fund also faced management problems associated with the quality and integrity of its trustees and agents. The
cabinet secretaries who administered the fund were of varying quality, and
their tenure depended on presidential preferences and political expediency. Most of the trustees had little or no experience in managing an investment portfolio. There were no rules or guidelines for prudent investment
for a pension fund with so much uncertainty regarding inXows and outXows. These circumstances represented a tenuous structure for the foundation for Wnancing navy pensions over a long period of time. Despite these
initial problems, the pension fund lasted, in one form or another, well
into the twentieth century, with some signiWcant interruptions along the
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way to be sure. However, one of the main conclusions to be drawn from the
fund’s history is that its longevity was more of a tribute to tradition and
public sector inertia than to efWciency.
The Wrst asset purchases for the navy pension fund were made in 1800
through the fund’s agent George Simpson. On November 11, 1800, Simpson made four purchases from A. Regnaud in the Philadelphia market.
Regnaud apparently made these purchases for the fund and then “sold”
the securities to Simpson, who was the agent of the Commissioners of the
fund. The bonds are listed as being purchased by Simpson from Regnaud.
The records do not indicate from whom Regnaud purchased the bonds.
(The reader should note that throughout this discussion, speciWc issues of
U.S. government bonds are referred to by their coupon yields on $100
bonds. So, for example, a “Six” is a U.S. government bond with a 6 percent
coupon. This labeling was the tradition of the day in early nineteenthcentury Wnancial markets. The reader should also note that U.S. securities
were typically, and somewhat confusingly, referred to as “stock.”) The initial
investment of the fund included 30 shares, at $100 par value per share, of
the U.S. 8 percent bonds at a price of $108.25, 80 shares of these “Eights”
at $108.00, and 89 shares of U.S. navy 6 percent bonds at a price of $90.00.
In addition, the trustees bought U.S. 6 percent stock [bonds] with a par
value of $4,227.56 at a discount price of $88.75 per share. The total amount
invested in this Wrst acquisition was $23,643.46. There was a brokerage
charge to the fund of 0.25 percent amounting to $59.12, and a commission
charge of 0.50 percent totaling $118.54.
Simpson’s transactions with Regnaud were made through the cashier of
the First Bank of the United States. After completing the transactions,
Simpson retained a cash balance of $32.76 and the fund had $6,024.32 in
cash on hand. This detailed information is included in the Wrst report of
the Commissioners of the Navy Pension Fund, submitted by Benjamin Stoddert, Secretary of the Navy, on behalf of the trustees of the pension fund on
December 2, 1800, as transmitted to the U.S. House of Representatives. The
source of the funds for the purchases was listed as $23,859.88 available
from prize money.2
This purchase is typical of how investments were made over the life of the
fund and provides a glimpse at the market in which these transactions took
place. The Eights were bought at a premium while the Sixes were bought
at a discount indicating that the prevailing market interest rate was about
7 percent. The fact that all four of the initial purchases were made on a
single day at prices that seem reasonable—that is, in the neighborhood of
market prices—suggests that the market in Philadelphia for U.S. stocks was
relatively liquid. The original U.S. debt had been issued in 1790 and was
actively traded in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, with considerable activity in other markets, like Charleston. In 1800, the outstanding issues of U.S. stock could be described as “seasoned,” and prices were
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published weekly in the cities with active securities markets. In November
1800 when the U.S. Sixes were bought by Regnaud at $90.00, the same security was also quoted in New York at $90.00, in Boston at $91.375, and in
Philadelphia at $89.75 (Sylla, Wilson, and Wright 1997).
These purchases in 1800 marked the beginning of a period in which the
navy pension fund’s assets were invested in interest-yielding securities. The
trustees of the fund attempted to remain as fully invested as possible and
generally followed a “buy and hold” strategy over most of the life of the
fund. The Xow of prize monies from the sale of captured ships and contraband that provided the basic capital of the fund are not consistently provided in the annual reports. The data available in these reports show great
irregularity and extreme variance in the amount of new monies transferred
to the fund from year to year, which as detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, was a
pervasive characteristic of the prize system. A basic portfolio strategy would
have been to convert cash obtained from the sale of prizes into a regular
income Xow with the objective of matching income from investments to
expected beneWt payments. Excluding the extraordinary liabilities levied by
Congress in the 1830s (see Chapter 4 above), expenditures from the fund
were more predictable and consistent than the Xow of new monies into the
fund. With a buy and hold strategy for government securities redeemed at par,
capital gains and losses would depend on whether the original assets were
bought at a premium, yielding a loss, or a discount, yielding a gain. An annual account of the securities held by the fund over its life is provided below.
Creating an annual accounting of the Wnancial status of the fund is
extremely difWcult given the records that have survived. The poor quality
of the Wnancial records of the fund presented earlier scholars with similar
problems. For example, William Glasson, an early historian of U.S. pensions, observed: “During a large part of its history, the accounts of the navy
pension fund were kept in so irregular a way that it would bafXe an expert
accountant to prepare a complete and accurate statement of its Wnancial
history” (Glasson 1918). Our attempt to construct a series of the annual
assets held by the fund led us to the conclusion that Glasson’s observation
is extremely kind.
Annual reports of the fund vary as to the date submitted to Congress
between September and the following January, and they vary in detail
regarding vouchers. The 1824 report was not submitted but was reconstructed and Wnally made available in 1828. Reported income from the
fund sometimes confused “reimbursements” with interest and dividends
received from investments. In several years, the dividends paid by bank
stocks were either not received or were not recorded to the credit of the
fund. The results of the periodic and special audits that were conducted differ from the data in the annual reports. Thus, the data in the tables presented below should be regarded as a best approximation of the history of
the portfolio of the fund. Curiously, the quality of the reporting of Wnancial
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data for the fund is probably better at the beginning of these reports than
at the end.
Table 5.1 provides a detailed account of the fund’s investment portfolio
from 1800 through 1813. It is difWcult to determine the exact value of the
fund during these years because consistent information on the cash held
by the fund is not available. It is clear that the trustees often were unable or
unwilling to invest the monies in the fund fully. This fact was all too clear
to those monitoring the fund’s activity at the time. Indeed, the managers
of the fund were periodically rebuked by Congress for maintaining large
cash positions instead of purchasing interest-earning assets. An example of
this problem was indicated in the trustees’ report of 1806. This report, submitted to Congress after a delay of several months, stated:
This report has been unusually delayed, under the expectation that it would, by this
time, have been practicable to include in it an account of the investment of thirtythree thousand dollars, part of thirty-Wve thousand four hundred dollars received
from the treasury in November last, for the navy six per cent stock belonging to the
fund; but this expectation has not been entirely fulWlled. It has been found
extremely difWcult of late to invest money in the public stocks to advantage. (ASPNA, 1, no. 57)

The investment portfolio from 1800 through 1808 was allocated entirely
in U.S. government stocks. Investments included a mix of coupon amounts
including the Sixes, Deferreds, and Eights. In addition, the fund initially
acquired the Threes in 1806. (Again, the assets held by the fund, as
described in the narrative below, are referred to by their popular, as
opposed to their ofWcial, designation.) More detailed descriptions of the
assets are provided in the appendix to this chapter.
Although the Threes had a lower coupon rate, the price in Philadelphia
in 1805–6 ranged between $59.00 and $64.00, representing a current yield
of about 5 percent. The Philadelphia prices of the Sixes and Deferreds at
that time ranged from a low of $89.00 in 1805 to a high of $100.00 at the
end of 1806. The Navy Sixes, which were acquired in 1800, were redeemed
in 1807, with the proceeds being invested in the Louisiana Sixes and additional purchases of the Threes. The Eights were redeemed in 1809 with the
proceeds, surprisingly, given the history of the fund’s portfolio to that date,
being invested in the stock of a local bank, the Columbia Bank. This investment marks the beginning of the fund’s experience with private equities.
The Columbia Bank was chartered in 1793 by an act of the General
Assembly of Maryland. The stated purpose of the bank was to promote the
agricultural and commercial interests of the state and facilitate the preparations for the permanent residence of Congress within the District of
Columbia (Fenstermaker 1965). Additional shares of the Columbia Bank
were purchased in 1810, and shares in the Union Bank and the Washington
Bank, two other local—that is, D.C.—banks, were purchased in 1811 and

3,752
4,794
4,794
18,621
16,386
25,363
25,459
24,501
22,784
20,962
19,025
16,975
14,796
12,483

1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813

—
5,362
5,362
21,504
25,526
45,233
46,899
47,002
45,230
43,466
41,534
39,483
37,305
34,993

Deferred
8,900
9,300
31,800
31,800
33,400
33,400
35,400(a)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Navy
13,900
37,100
37,100
54,400
54,400
55,600
59,300
59,300
59,300
59,300(b)
—
—
—
—

Eights
—
—
—
—
—
5,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
38,000
38,000
38,000
38,000

Louisiana
—
—
—
—
—
—
20,305
29,291
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896

Threes
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
3,250
3,250
3,250
3,250
3,250
—
—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
48,523(b)
60,103(c)
60,103(d)
60,103(e)
60,103

Converted Columbia
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10,690(d)
15,340(e)
15,340(f )

Union
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
8,200(d)
14,260(e)
14,260(f )

Washington

26,552
56,556
79,056
126,325
129,712
164,595
165,963(a)
177,344
175,460
220,397(b)
192,809
206,076
210,701
206,076

Portfolio
Total

9:27 AM

Source: ASP-NA, 1.
Values were reported to the nearest cent in the annual reports and have been rounded to the nearest dollar amount. Totals may not equal sums because
of rounding.
(a)
purchase of $2,000 Navy Sixes was made on April 19, 1806, and the debt was repaid on October 1. The end-of-year value of the portfolio was $165,963.
(b)
The $59,300 Louisiana 6 percent holdings matured on January 1, 1809. The Columbia Bank shares were purchased over the period July–September
1809 and at the end of the year included 283 complete shares and 343 short shares. At year-end, the total portfolio was valued at $220,397.
(c)
Columbia Bank shares included 476 complete shares and 150 short shares.
(d)
The bank shares included complete and short shares in the following amounts: Columbia Bank, 476 complete shares and 150 short shares; Union Bank,
300 complete shares and 200 short shares; and Washington Bank, 300 complete shares and 200 short shares.
(e)
The bank shares included complete and short shares in the following amounts: Columbia Bank, 476 complete shares and 150 short shares; Union Bank,
600 complete shares; and Washington Bank, 700 complete shares.
(f )
For bank shares, there is no change in whole or short shares from 1812.

Sixes

2/27/03

Year

Private bank stock

68

U.S. debt instruments

Table 5.1. Estimated Annual Value (based on cost) of the Naval Pension Fund, with Holdings by Type of Asset, 1800–13
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1812. In each case, these purchases of shares in privately owned banks
appear to be similar to an “initial public offering.” Initial purchases of both
the Union Bank and the Washington Bank were made in 1811, the year
both banks were chartered. On behalf of the navy pension fund, George
Macdaniel purchased $8,000 worth of shares in the Washington Bank in
November after the bank had been chartered in March. An additional
$6,000 was used to purchase shares in October 1812. Macdaniel also purchased $10,500 of shares of the Union Bank in November 1811 after this
bank had been chartered in February 1811. An additional $4,500 was used
to purchase shares in October 1812. Over the period 1809–13, $89,703 was
expended on the purchases of these local bank stocks. The investment in
these banks meant that by 1813, 44 percent of the portfolio of the fund was
composed of shares in private, locally traded securities.3
The fund grew rapidly over the period 1800–13, from $26,552 to over
$200,000. The increase in assets is primarily attributable to new prize
receipts. However, income from investments tended to exceed the annual
cost of the payment to pensioners. There were plentiful opportunities, relatively speaking, for buying securities that were nationally and internationally traded between 1809 and 1813. In addition, there was a large market in
U.S. government debt that was available for acquisition. The outstanding
value of U.S. debt was approximately $50 million during this period (Elliott
1845).
Given these other investment opportunities, why did the trustees choose
to invest in local banks that were far riskier than other available assets?
Perhaps they were opting for a higher risk and return proWle by allocating
a portion of their portfolio to private securities, and indeed “There is no
doubt that banking was generally proWtable during much of the period
prior to 1837” (Fenstermaker 1965). The early dividends paid by the Bank
of North America were between 12 and 16 percent (of par); the Bank of
Pennsylvania paid at least 8 percent per year; the Bank of Virginia had
proWts ranging from 9 percent in 1806 to 17 percent in 1813; and the Massachusetts Bank paid an average dividend in the last decades of the eighteenth century of over 12 percent. These rates were well above the interest
being paid on U.S. government debt and may have enticed the trustees
to consider investing a portion of the pension fund’s assets in private
banks. Still, the fact that only local—that is, D.C.—bank stock was purchased remains curious.
The records of income from investments indicate that in the years
between 1814 and 1819 returns from the local bank stocks did exceed the
interest rate on the available U.S. government bonds; however, this situation was quickly reversed in the 1820s, when each of these banks reduced
or eliminated dividends, and each ultimately failed. The Columbia Bank
paid dividends of around 10 percent in 1814, 1815, and 1817 with lower dividends reported in 1818 (5.6 percent) and 1819 (7.7 percent). No dividends
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from the Columbia Bank were received by the pension fund in 1816. In contrast, the Union Bank and the Washington Bank paid dividends of 12 to 15
percent in 1814, 1815, 1817, and 1819 and a 10 percent dividend in 1818.
Once again, no dividends from these banks were recorded by the pension
fund in 1816. Thus, in the Wrst decade after the purchase of these shares of
private equities, the pension fund received an average return on its total
investment of bank stocks of 8.1 percent, including the zero return for 1816.
If the fund managers were seeking risk reduction with portfolio diversiWcation and the potential for higher returns, it is difWcult to understand
why the narrowly held Washington, D.C. bank stocks were chosen. Other
more liquid, nationally traded, and “seasoned” bank stocks that were paying the same or higher dividend yields were available to the trustees. For
example, the trustees could have purchased shares in the First Bank of the
United States. Stock in this bank began trading after the bank was chartered in 1791, and this stock was very widely traded in Philadelphia,
Baltimore, New York, and Boston. On November 11, 1800, when Regnaud
made the Wrst purchases of bonds for the fund, the stock of the First Bank
could have been bought at a price of 140 (as a percent of par), and was paying an annual dividend of from 8 to 10 percent of par value.
The U.S. government was an original investor in this bank in 1791,
putting up 20 percent of the original capitalization of $10 million—25,000
shares at $400 per share (Studenski and Kroos 1963). The government had
earned a handsome return from this investment prior to the beginning of
the navy pension fund in 1800. Together, dividend income and capital gains
from sales of shares yielded the federal government an annualized rate of
return greater than 8 percent, the stock having traded as high as 150 percent of par. And this return was above and beyond the value of the services
of the First Bank with the handling of transactions of the government,
including the disbursement of pensions throughout the branches of the
Bank. The government sold the last lot of this stock in 1802, but had been
a holder of the stock for a decade (Lane 1997). This stock is an excellent
example of a high-quality, low-risk asset in which the fund did not invest.
Although the First Bank was not rechartered in 1811, the liquidation of the
stock was prompt and orderly, with all stockholders being reimbursed at par
value for their holdings (Elliott 1845; Hammond 1957; Perkins 1994). The
assets of the First Bank were bought up by Stephen Girard, and operated as
Girard’s Bank even beyond his death in 1831.
Even if one puts aside the opportunities in other bank stocks, by purchasing the three local bank stocks, the commissioners of the fund forfeited
liquidity and accepted greater risk for an additional 1–2 percent higher
return over U.S. bond yields. Given the uncertain future liabilities of the
fund and the uncertain Xow of future assets into the fund, this investment
choice is unconventional by today’s standards of asset management. Furthermore, as the notes to Table 5.1 make clear, these bank stocks were
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aquired in “half” shares and “whole” shares. The subscription schedule for
the initial capital in these banks provided for a time purchase plan for
acquiring the stocks. It is not clear whether the fund paid a market price for
the bank stocks or whether these purchases were arranged in some manner
consistent with the initial offerings of the capital stock. All of these and subsequent transactions in bank stocks were in one way or another through the
agent George Macdaniel, and as will become clear when the particulars of
these purchases are reviewed later, the acquisition of the bank stocks for the
fund has the scent of insider trading.
Table 5.2 provides the annual estimates of the fund’s portfolio for the
years 1814 through 1829. The fund more than doubled in size between
1813 and 1814, as it increased in value from $206,076 to $484,852. Between
1814 and 1829, the fund doubled again, growing to almost $1,000,000. The
assets purchased in 1814 and continuing through 1824 were concentrated
in the New Sixes issued to Wnance the War of 1812. Also during this period,
there were additional purchases of shares of the Columbia Bank in 1815,
1818, and 1819. These new investments brought the total expenditures for
Columbia stock to $99,502.60. These additional purchases of private bank
stock were made when the fund could have acquired stock in the Second
Bank of the United States, which was chartered through federal legislation
in 1816 and which began operations in January 1817.
Given that the authorized amount of capitalization of the Columbia
Bank was $1 million the navy pension fund owned almost 10 percent of the
bank. The value of the private securities held by the fund in 1819 was
$129,266. This meant that 15 percent of the fund’s portfolio of $874,672
was allocated to these private stocks, which, as we have seen, were yielding
about 8 percent per annum. The subsequent Wnancial history of the fund
did not prove to be as successful. In 1823–24, Columbia Bank ceased doing
business, and it ultimately failed altogether. Although the fund continued
to carry Columbia Bank stock on its books valued either at cost or par, these
assets are excluded from both tables as of year-end 1824.
The failure of the Columbia Bank coincided with the large-scale redemption of U.S. government debt. Between 1819 and 1829, the Sixes and Deferreds were being retired, along with some of the New Sixes, while the
fund acquired the new debt being issued by the treasury in bonds bearing
4.5 percent and 5 percent coupon rates. At the end of 1829, the majority of
the fund was invested in these securities, with a lesser amount in the New
Sixes along with the original Threes.
When the Second Bank of the United States began doing business in
1817, it would have been possible for the fund to get in on the initial subscription to the stock of this bank. This was a very large bank by the standards of the day with initial capital of $35 million (350,000 shares at $100
each). As with the First Bank of the United States, the government had
the responsibility of subscribing to one-Wfth of the stock, and as with that

$42,483
37,365
32,849
25,957
21,135
17,830
14,326
10,601
6,657
2,465
—
—
—
—
—
—

1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829

$38,000
38,000
38,000
38,000
19,000
8,740
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Louisiana
$30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
30,896
50,896
50,896
50,896

Threes
$283,769
393,593
393,593
531,393
687,102
687,103
696,536
721,295
739,956
748,051
758,940
689,670
707,406
573,020
304,401
301,669

New Sixes
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
$150,000
150,000
257,736(f )
257,736(f )
512,011(f )

4.5s
and fives
Union
$15,340
15,340
15,340
15,340
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503
15,503

Columbia
$60,103(a)
69,103(b)
69,103
69,103
89,503(c)
99,503(d)
99,503
99,503
99,503
99,503
—(e)
—
—
—
—
—
$14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260
14,260

Washington

$484,852
598,557
594,041
724,950
877,236
874,672
870,862
891,895
906,662
910,515
819,436(e)
900,166
917,902
911,252(f )
641,633(f )
950,675(g)

Portfolio
Total

2/27/03
9:27 AM

Source: ASP-NA, 1 (1814–23), 2, 3 (1824–29). The Statement of the Condition of the Navy Pension Fund, February 20, 1829,3: pp. 322–24 is especially
helpful. The 1824 report was not Wled, but included as an amendment in 1828.
Values were reported to the nearest cent in the annual reports and have been rounded to the nearest dollar amount. Totals may not equal sums because
of rounding.
(a)
The shares of the bank stocks include 476 complete shares and 150 short shares of Columbia Bank, and 600 whole shares of Union Bank and 700 shares
of Washington Bank. The holdings of Union Bank and Washington Bank remain constant over this period.
(b)
Columbia Bank shares include 626 complete shares.
(c)
Columbia Bank shares include 826 complete shares.
(d)
Columbia Bank shares include 890 complete shares and 90 short shares, which remain constant over the period.
(e)
Excluding Columbia Bank, which failed as of 1824. The Fund, however, continued reporting the original cost of the complete and short sales as part
of the assets in their reports through 1830. Reported totals have been revised to reXect the failure of the Bank.
(f )
Of the total, $34,444 is invested in Fives and the remainder in Four and OneHalf. It is possible that the additional purchase of Threes is reXected as
the face value amount (nominal) instead of the cost, therefore confusing the total with cost-based and maturity values.
(g)
The total includes a purchase of $56,499 of the Washington Corporation.

Sixes
and deferred

Private bank stock

72

Year

U.S. debt instruments

Table 5.2. Estimated Annual Value (based on cost) of the Naval Pension Fund, with Holdings by Type of Asset, 1814–29.
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earlier case, this proved to be a very proWtable investment (Studenski and
Kroos 1963). The dividends paid by the Second Bank were approximately
6 percent of par value annually. It is reported that the government held
its 70,000 shares over the 20-year life of the bank. Furthermore, the U. S.
navy—not the navy’s pension fund(!)—is reported as holding 62 shares in
1820, 393 shares in 1822, and 502 shares in July of 1823 (Catterall 1903).
Yet the navy pension fund did not acquire any stock in the Second Bank
until 1832, when it was ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to buy only
the Second Bank stock for its portfolio.
Table 5.3 reports the asset holdings for the years 1830–35; Table 5.4 provides similar data for 1836–40, although no estimate is given for 1837
because of very limited data. These years show a great deal of shufXing of
the portfolio. Some of the reallocation is due to the fact that almost all of
the U.S. debt was being redeemed. Between 1829 and 1830, there was a very
large increase in the amount of the Threes, Four and Halfs, and Fives being
held as the last of the New Sixes were redeemed. In 1829, some municipal
stock had been bought in the Washington Corporation, which went under
various names during the years in question. In 1832, as the U.S. Threes
were being redeemed, the fund, after being directed by Congress to do so,
Wnally made large purchases of stock in the Second Bank of the United
States.
Unfortunately, these purchases probably reXected political rather than
economic calculations. The fund began purchasing shares in the Second
Bank of the United States because it had been directed to do so following
several audits. The trustees were also being reviewed for their handling of
the Columbia Bank investments. There was considerable correspondence
between the trustees and Congress concerning these investments and the
request for reimbursement of the fund’s losses associated with the bankruptcy of Columbia Bank. (Details of the Wnancial history of the Columbia
Bank are provided in Chapter 6.)
By the Act of Congress in July 1832, the fund began acquiring stock in
the Second Bank of the United States and according to the annual report
of the fund dated November 16, 1832, the total holdings of the stock
amounted to $167,900. The original trustees had been removed from their
jobs, and now the remaining trustee, the Secretary of the Navy, was constrained in the function of managing the portfolio. Examination of the
detailed documentation of the annual reports of the fund shows that stock
in the Second Bank was purchased directly from the Treasury and at par
value. For instance, the annual report of 1833 shows several entries of purchases like that of June 18, 1833: “Paid Secretary of the Treasury for 310
shares of United States Bank stock . . . $31,000,” or at $100 per share. But,
on the other hand, entries show the fund selling bank shares at a market
price that was greater than par: for example, two days later on June 20,
1833, “From the Secretary of the Navy for proceeds of 180 shares of the

Nominal value

—
—
59,472
—
15,000
14,000
1,003,880

—
—
59,472
—
15,000
14,000
1,059,773

15,000
14,000
937,047

15,000
14,000
947,565

59,472
100,000

140,221
212,469

140,221(e)
212,469(f )
59,472
100,000(g)

256,900(d)

(c)

167,900(d)

$149,483

(c)

1833

$227,985

1832

15,000
14,000
1,142,462

59,472
100,000

140,221
212,469

—
—
$601,300(d)

1834

15,000
14,000
1,160,262

59,472
100,000

140,221
212,469

—
—
$619,000(d)

1835

9:27 AM

Source: ASP-NA, 3(1830), 4 (1831–35).
Values were reported to the nearest cent, but have been rounded to the nearest dollar. Totals may not equal sums because of rounding.
(a)
The values of Threes and the other U.S. debt were calculated from the total U.S. stocks listed by the Naval Pension Fund from an aggregate, using data
from 1829 and detail from redemptions and purchases.
(b)
Estimates prior to 1836 were based, so far as possible, on the cost basis of acquiring the assets. During the latter period the reporting was based on
nominal or par value of the stocks, and that reporting was in transition at the end of the data. For 1830, the prices paid by the fund for the stocks included
in the portfolio were: total U.S. stocks $804,260 relative to the nominal amount of $915,408—bought at an average discount; the City of Washington stock
(called variously the Washington Corporation and Washington 5 Percent Lottery) was acquired for $56,499; with the bank stock of Columbia $99,503
bought at an average premium, Union $15,340, and Washington $14,260—both of which bought at an average premium. Over this period, the annual
reports were made between the dates of September 30 and December 31, and end-of-year represents the date of the report.
(c)
The Threes and Fives were reported only in the aggregate. It should be assumed that the majority of the debt is in the Threes, since the Fives were being
redeemed.
(d)
The shares of the Bank of the U.S. appear to have been purchased directly from the Treasury at a par value of $100 per share. However, this doesn’t
match perfectly with the Annual Reports of the Fund in terms of the number of shares bought and sold.
(e)
The Maryland Five bonds were purchased over time at an average price of $109.03, for a current yield of 4.59 percent.
(f )
The Pennsylvania Five bonds were purchased at an average price of $114.60, for a current yield of 4.36 percent.
(g)
The Cincinnati Five bonds were purchased at an average price of $110.275, for a current yield of 4.53 percent.

$175,666
739,742
—

1831

Year

2/27/03

$133,222
745,387
—

1830

(b)

74

U.S. stocks
Threes
4.5s and Fives
Bank of the U.S
State debt
Maryland Fives
Pennsylvania Fives
Local debt
Washington Fives
Cincinnati Fives
Private stocks
Union Bank
Washington Bank
Total value

Assets

(a)

Table 5.3. Estimated Annual Par Value of the Naval Pension Fund, with Holdings by Type of Asset, 1830–35
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Bank of the United States sold . . . $20,468.70,” which is $113.715 per share.
These entries continue on through 1834, but with the sales, the fund
reports the gross receipts without reporting the number of shares sold, making it impossible to determine from their accounting whether the sales were
“proWtable” to the fund. However, market prices of this stock are available
for the New York and Philadelphia markets for 1833 and 1834, showing the
Bank stock remaining 10 percent to 25 percent above par through 1838
(Sylla et al. 1997). Such a situation for the fund represented another government subsidy; however, it cannot be ascertained whether or not it was an
intentional action by the Congress. By the end of 1835, the fund’s holdings
in the Second Bank totaled $619,100 of the total value of the fund of
$1,160,262, or 53.36 percent. Nevertheless, the source of some of the funds
used in the purchase of stock in the Second Bank had come from another
act of Congress. This legislation provided reimbursement for loss of principal and foregone dividends from the Columbia Bank due to its demise. An
entry in the annual report of the fund for 1834 includes the item on July 24,
“From the Treasurer of the United States, for Columbia Bank stock, purchased of the navy pension fund by the United States per act of Congress,
approved 30th June, 1834 . . . $167,164.40.”
Interestingly, by the end of 1835, the Second Bank of the United States
had ceased to exist as part of the government. The battle over the bill to renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States became known as
the “bank war” (Schlesinger 1945; Hammond 1957; Temin 1969). The Democratic antagonism toward the national bank dated from the early days of
Jefferson’s leadership of the party. Andrew Jackson’s verbal assaults on the
bank were, as we have seen, even more vituperative than his predecessor’s.
They did not call him Old Hickory without reason; his actions lived up to
his words. When the pro-bank Whigs attempted to make the election of
1832 a referendum on the national bank by passing a recharter act four
years before the Second Bank’s charter actually expired, Jackson called
their bluff and vetoed the bill. His subsequent landslide victory effectively
ended national banking in the United States for more than a generation
and eliminated an institution that could serve as a central bank for nearly
80 years.
The Second Bank closed as a government entity as of March 3, 1835. As
with the First Bank of the United States, the original 20-year charter of the
Second Bank expired without being renewed by Congress because of Jackson’s veto. Due to these events, the navy pension fund again began to acquire
private bank equity after being directed to do so by the government. The
bank reverted to a private bank, chartered in Pennsylvania. The new bank
was called the Bank of the United States of Philadelphia and continued to
operate without closing the books of the U.S. Bank. The change in status
led to a dispute about reimbursement to the government for the remaining
shares of the original bank. It was Wnally agreed that the government would

Union Bank
Washington Bank

Washington Fives
Cincinnati Fives
Washington Sixes
15,000
14,000
1,143,639

59,472
100,000
—

101,097
212,469
—

$641,600

15,000
14,000
1,049,232

59,472
100,000
6,691(b)

—
97,469
100,000(a)

$641,600

1837

Year

13,200
14,000
390,832

59,472
100,000
6,691

—
$ 97,469
100,000

—

1838

11,400
14,000
253,139

57,739
100,000
—

—
—
$ 70,000

—

1839

Source: Annual Reports of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy in documents of the U.S. House of Representatives and reports from the U.S. Senate.
Values were reported to the nearest cent, but have been rounded to the nearest dollar. Totals might not equal sums because of rounding.
(a)
The Illinois Sixes were purchased at a price of $106.00, for a current yield of 5.66 percent.
(b)
The price paid for the Washington Sixes cannot be ascertained.

Total value

Private stocks

Local debt

Maryland Fives
Pennsylvania Fives
Illinois Sixes

Bank of the U. S.

1836

11,400
14,000
158,739

$ 33,389
100,000
—

—
—
—

—

1840

9:27 AM

State debt

U.S. stocks

Nominal value

2/27/03

Assets
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Table 5.4. Estimated Annual Par Value of the Naval Pension Fund, with Holdings by Type of Asset, 1836–40
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be reimbursed at a price of $114.14 per share to be paid in equal installments (plus 6 percent interest per year) over the four years 1837–40.
Meanwhile, the Second Bank of the United States of Philadelphia was going
bankrupt. The price of its stock Wrst fell below par in October 1839, when
the price of a share fell to $67.00 in New York from a closing price in
September of $103.125. By the end of 1842, the stock was selling for $1.50
per share.
The history of this bank after 1838 is essentially irrelevant to the navy
pension fund, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, had steadily been
liquidating the stock to meet pension payments. The annual reports show
that the fund held no stock in the Second Bank as of September 30, 1838.
As the Second Bank of the U.S. of Philadelphia was nearing bankruptcy,
the navy pension fund was approaching bankruptcy itself due to excessive
back payment claims and the problems of meeting pension demands, as
described in Chapter 4.
Before the purchases of stock in the Second Bank of the United States,
the fund acquired the state debt of Maryland and of Pennsylvania, beginning in 1832, along with the local debt of Cincinnati, also purchased in
1832. Each of these assets paid a 5 percent coupon rate. As described in
the footnotes to the tables, these stocks were bought at a premium. Indeed,
practically all government debt ever acquired by the fund was purchased at
a premium, except for the early Deferred Sixes and the Threes, which
typically traded at a discount because of their “less than market” coupon. In
1837, a large quantity of Illinois bonds and a small additional amount
of local debt in Washington were added to the fund’s portfolio. These purchases were made at the same time that the charter of the Second Bank of
the United States was being terminated. Over the period 1830–36, the total
amount of the portfolio remained rather constant at roughly $1 million, but
fell sharply in 1838 to $390,832, as stocks had to be sold in order to meet
the increased pension obligations of the fund (see Chapter 4).
The total amount of the portfolio at the end of 1839 was $253,139 with
the par value of the Cincinnati and Washington municipal stock listed as
$100,000 and $57,739. Shares of the Union and Washington Bank were
listed as $11,400 and $14,000 and Illinois state bonds had a recorded value
of $70,000. The 1840 annual report listed the total portfolio as $148,739
with the same amounts of bank stock as 1839 and the bonds of Cincinnati
at $100,000. The Washington stock was pared down to $33,339.
In the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy dated November 20,
1841, the condition of the fund is described by Commissioner of Pensions,
J. L. Edwards. The report shows that the obligations of the fund far exceeded the sum of anticipated income and capital. Edwards stated:
The only stocks which now remain of the navy pension fund are 700 shares of
the Bank of Washington, the nominal amount of which is $14,000, and stock of the
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Union Bank of Georgetown, the nominal amount of which is $9,600. The latter
institution is closing its concerns, and, as soon as collections can be made, the directors will pay from the dividends of its capital stock the amount due to the navy pension fund. The stock of the Bank of Washington cannot now be sold at advantage,
and the amount of interest which it yields is so inconsiderable that I have not introduced it into the present report as available. (U.S. Senate 1841)

Shortly after this report was submitted, the fund was formally liquidated,
and Congress began paying navy pensions from the general fund of the
treasury.

Problems with the Administration of the Pension Fund
The basic organizational Xaw with the navy pension fund was the division
of responsibilities in the determination of plan characteristics. These
included eligibility for beneWts, the generosity of annual beneWts, and the
Xow of new monies into the fund from the sale of prizes. This situation left
the managers of the portfolio somewhat vulnerable to the temptation to
maximize returns from their investments in order to provide the revenues
needed to meet the fund’s increasing liabilities.
The commissioners of the navy pension fund from the fund’s beginning
in 1800 through 1832 included the Secretaries of the Navy, the War Department, and the Treasury. From 1832, the fund was under the sole control of
the Secretary of the Navy, who, of course, was appointed by the president.
By the Act of 1832, the Secretary of the Treasury gained greater control
over the assets that could be purchased. It is clear that political issues during the early years of the republic played a prominent role in the portfolio
decisions of the fund and were of special importance regarding the U.S.
debt and the federal banks. Table 5.5 contains the names and dates of the
secretaries for the periods of their responsibilities for overseeing the fund;
Table 5.6 lists some of the Boards of Directors of the Columbia Bank for the
period. A brief summary shows that the mean average term for any trustee
was about 3.5 years, and the number of years when there was exact overlap
of members was much shorter.
With the possible exception of the Secretary of the Treasury, very few of
the participants as “commissioners” had any practical experience with matters of portfolio management. These political appointees were not equally
competent at their jobs. Catterall (1903) provides an assessment of two
treasury secretaries following Albert Gallatin’s resignation of the post:
“Thereupon William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, became Secretary of the
Treasury, and in his person helpless inefWciency was placed in control of the
government Wnances. Surrendering the post in February, 1814, he was succeeded by the equally inefWcient George W. Campbell.” There is no doubt
that others could be added; yet there are counter examples, like Gallatin
and Alexander Dallas. Little detail about the internal organization of the
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staff of the pension fund exists. However, it appears that the agents must
have been playing a major role, while the commissioners were simply ratifying the activities of the staff. The sporadic reports of various auditors of
the fund suggest that the routine operations of the portfolio’s management
did not have much effective oversight.
With the beneWt of hindsight, the two greatest errors of commission were
the rather large investment in Columbia Bank (and D.C. banks in general)

Table 5.5. Commissioners of the Navy Pension Fund, 1800–1842
Secretaries of the Navy, 1800–1842
Benjamin Stoddert
Robert Smith
Paul Hamilton
William Jones
Benjamin Crowinshield
Thompson Smith
Samuel L. Southard
John Branch
Levi Woodbury
Mahlon Dickerson
James K. Paulding
George E. Badger
Able P. Upshur

1798–1801
1801–1809
1809–1813
1813–1814
1814–1818
1818–1823
1823–1829
1829–1831
1831–1834
1834–1838
1838–1841
1841
1841–1843

Secretaries of War, 1800–1832
Samuel Dexter
Henry Dearborn
William Eustis
John Armstrong
James Monroe
William H. Crawford
John C. Calhoun
James Barbour
Peter B. Porter
John H. Eaton
Lewis Cass

1800–1801
1801–1809
1809–1813
1813–1814
1814–1815
1815–1817
1817–1825
1825–1828
1828–1829
1829–1831
1831–1837

Secretaries of the Treasury, 1800–1832
Oliver Wolcott
Albert Gallatin
William Jones
George W. Campbell
Alexander J. Dallas
William H. Crawford
Richard Rush
Samuel Ingham
Louis McLane

1795–1801
1801–1813
1813
1813–1814
1814–1816
1816–1825
1825–1829
1829–1831
1831–1833

The Act for the Better Government of the Navy on the United States in 1800 stated that the
Commissioners of the navy pension fund would be the Secretaries of the Navy, War, and
Treasury. This organizational structure lasted until 1832, when it was decided to simplify the
decision making and place the responsibility solely in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy.
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and the position taken to invest in the Second Bank of the United States in
1835–36 after the bid to recharter the bank failed. The two greatest errors
of omission in managing the portfolio were the failure to buy stock in the
First Bank of the United States in 1800 or thereafter and the failure to purchase stock in the Second Bank of the United States when it was initially
offered in 1816.
The logical explanation for the fund’s purchases of locally traded stock
in Washington banks instead of the U.S. Bank stocks is that politics were
involved. President Thomas Jefferson was a strong opponent of the First
Bank, and his allies ultimately mustered the political forces to prevent the
rechartering of the bank during the Madison administration in 1811. Similarly, President Andrew Jackson was opposed to the Second Bank, and most
other banks for that matter, and assembled enough support to prevent its
recharter in 1835. Jackson had vetoed the recharter bill in 1832, which his
Whig opponents had pushed through Congress during the election campaign of that year. One can imagine the difWculty the trustees would have
had in buying stock in a bank that was strongly criticized by the president
who appointed them. There is no remaining evidence in ofWcial records that
the trustees explicitly discussed political considerations. Thus, it is only speculation—an educated guess, perhaps—that the decisions not to purchase
shares of the federal banks from 1800 through 1832 had political roots.
The Democratic faction’s opposition to banks is well documented. In
general, agrarians distrusted banks, and they particularly objected to the
idea of Wnancial power concentrated in a federal or national bank modeled
after the Bank of England. Many early Democrats (or Republicans, as they
were sometimes confusingly called) thought that the national banks existed
only to consolidate Wnancial power in the hands of the federal government,
taking regular business away from private commercial banks and diminishing state autonomy. Another major argument against the Second Bank was
that so many shares were owned by foreigners; in fact, it was facetiously
referred to as a “British” bank, which played a large part in the failure to
recharter the Bank (Hammond 1957). This experience may provide some
guidance to those who are recommending that the assets of the Social
Security fund in the twenty-Wrst century be invested in equities. If history
is a guide, then political considerations may well dominate the portfolio
selection.
Another shortcoming in the management of the fund seems to be its
failure to reinvest surplus revenues in a timely manner. Whether this apparent oversight resulted from misfeasance or nonfeasance is difWcult to ascertain from the records that survive, but in either case this shortcoming was
apparent from the beginning of the fund. Two of the earliest assets in the
pension portfolio required quarterly maintenance in reinvestment. The constant turnover in these assets required a keen accounting of reimbursement
versus net revenue Xows. The original Sixes and Deferreds paid interest
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quarterly, the Sixes from their inception in 1791 and the Deferreds after a
period of ten years (hence the name “deferreds”). They then paid quarterly
interest of $1.50 like the Sixes. By the time the fund began operations, having acquired the Sixes in 1800 and the Deferreds in 1801, these instruments
had been converted to 8 percent annuities.
At the time the original debt was issued, Hamilton established a sinking
fund to buy these bonds back on the open market at the rate of 2 percent
per annum. Holding the assets in an account receiving the interest from
the repurchased bonds and making the 2 percent redemption compounded
quarterly would have enabled the U.S. government to retire the debt in
23.8 years. However, the open market purchase plan soon fell behind schedule, and Congress subsequently legislated a mechanized plan in which the
bonds were converted into annuities. The Sixes and Deferreds under this
plan would be fully redeemed by 1818 and 1824, respectively. The basic idea
Table 5.6. Directors of Columbia Bank, 1793–1824
Board of Directors, 1794
James Lingan
Marsham Waring
Uriah Forrest
William Marbury
Thomas Law
Francis Deakins

James Dunlop
John Templeton
John Laird
Robert Frost
Charles Lowndes
John Mason

Board of Directors, 1809
Charles Worthington
William Marbury
John Cox
John Threlkeid
Walter Smith
Washington Bowie

Henry Foxhall
Marsham Waring
James Dunlop
Philip B. Key
Jeremiah Williams
Thomas Peter

Board of Directors, 1826
Richard T. Lowndes
Samuel Ridout
George H. Stewart
Thomas G. Pratt
John Litle
Francis S. Key

John MacDaniel, Jr.
James Eakin
John D. Barclay
Benjamin Harrison
Thomas Davis
William Parker

Columbia Bank was founded in 1793, with the two principal backers becoming the Wrst and
second presidents of the bank, Samuel Blodget (1793) and Benjamin Stoddert (1794–1798).
The third president, John Mason (1798–1816), was followed by Nathaniel Frye (1826–1828)
and Richard Lowndes (1828–1837). Members of the Board of Directors of the bank are available from Walsh (1940) for selected dates; members for 1794, 1809, and 1826 are provided.
Three directors continued from the 1794 to the 1809 board: William Marbury, Marsham
Waring, and James Dunlop. None of the directors in 1826 had continued from 1809, but two
surnames continued from the snapshots from past boards, Key from 1809 and Lowndes from
1794. Columbia Bank was essentially defunct as of 1824, but it appears that the administration
continued until at least 1837.
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was as follows: For each $100 par value the quarterly payments would be
$1.50 in each of the Wrst three quarters and $3.50 in the last quarter. This
payment of $8.00 included an investment return of $6.00 (6 percent on the
$100 bond) and a $2.00 redemption in the value of the bond.
The next year, the bond had a principal value of $98.00. The same schedule of payments was then applied. However, each of the $1.50 quarterly
payments represented a partial percentage redemption of principal. In
addition, the Wnal quarter’s payment of $3.50 further reduced the remaining value of the bond. The determination in each quarter of the amount of
the coupon payment representing “income” and the amount representing
“redemption” is a complex matter, because each quarter the “income” portion declines and the “redemption” portion increases. After ten years of
such repayments (1805 for the Sixes and 1811 for the Deferreds), the $8.00
annual Xows on these instruments represented $3.57442051 of “redemption” and $4.42557949 of “income” on the remaining principal of the
bond. This compared to the original $2.00 and $6.00 respective amounts
in the initial year (Sylla and Wilson 1999). To appropriately value holdings
of the fund and its net income, redemptions needed to be separated from
the interest payments. The redemptions were actually sales of assets, and
these funds should have been reinvested to maintain the Wnancial position
of the fund. The trustees did not or were not able to make this distinction
in their cash Xow. As a result, both redemptions and interest payments were
reported as income and the decline in asset value went unrecognized.
In fact, it is doubtful the managers of the fund paid much attention to dividend or coupon bond income. An audit of the transactions of the pension
fund found that the fund had no record of any dividends received from Columbia Bank, Washington Bank, or Union Bank for the years 1816, 1823, and
1824, and from Washington and Union Banks for 1828. In addition to missing these bank dividend Xows entirely, the audit report criticized the trustees
for their failure to reinvest excess cash balances in income producing assets.
In one instance regarding prompt investment of idle balances, Congress
had directed the navy pension fund to respond to several speciWc inquiries
in 1829 (ASP-NA, 2). Congress asked the Secretary of the Navy, Samuel
Southard, to account for the 1828 annual report, where “it appears that
more than $250,000 lay uninvested for six months, . . . without any explanation of the cause, or in whose hands the money lay idle. In no one of these
statements can we Wnd what premium or commission was paid on the purchases of any of these stocks.” During this same inquiry, Congress was trying to obtain from the Navy the amount and cause of a loss ranging from a
minimum estimate of $142,899.58 to a maximum estimate of $293,823.50
(ASP-NA, 2). The accounts were in such bad shape that it seems impossible
that the fund could have been managed in an efWcient manner.
Part of this actual or perceived loss might have been associated with the
failure of Columbia Bank, which was still carried on the pension fund’s
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annual reports as an asset through 1829. When Columbia Bank failed in
1824, the secretary of the navy initiated a series of appeals to the Treasury
and Congress to reimburse the fund for its loss in order to honor the fund’s
commitments to pensioners, widows, and orphans by continuing their pensions. In response, in 1829, the House of Representatives directed Secretary
Southard to provide a complete accounting of the fund in terms of losses,
operation costs, monies received from prizes, and so forth annually from
1814 through 1828.
The Navy’s response to this directive reveals much information that was
not available from the original annual reports (ASP-NA, 2). There ensued
a series of correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the
House of Representatives that revealed that the navy pension fund had not
done a very good job in managing its portfolio. Among these items of
neglect was the failure of the fund to receive the bank dividends for several
of the years covered in the accounting. The details of these managerial
shortcomings are provided in the appendix to this chapter. In summary,
the criticisms dealt with an attempt to recover the dividends, amounting to
at least $3,700. This was not a trivial sum. At the time, it was equal to the
monthly pension of $5 for over 60 seamen for one year without considering
forgone returns that these monies would have earned. In one case, uncollected dividends extended back for over a decade. Separately, all of the forgone dividends to the fund had been paid to “late” agents of the fund, but
the agents had not credited the monies back to the fund’s portfolio. The
failure to credit the missing dividends suggests outright malfeasance.
Another item of concern was the custom, in operation since 1800, of paying commissions to the agent who acquired an asset for the fund. The typical charges were 0.25 percent and in some cases 0.5 percent. For example,
George Macdaniel received a commission of 0.5 percent of the dollar value
of his purchases of Columbia Bank stock. These commissions were similar
to those being charged by brokers in New York (Werner and Smith 1991).
Macdaniel’s account for that period also listed his receipt of a half-year’s
dividends from Columbia Bank on 283 full shares and 343 short shares
totaling $1,680.80. Also in Macdaniel’s hands were balances from paying
pensioners and from an account to buy stocks. With this account was a
note from Thomas Turner, of the Navy Accountant’s OfWce, to Macdaniel:
“The Treasurer of the United States will be pleased to receive of George
Macdaniel the above two thousand and eleven dollars thirty-seven cents,
and pass it to the credit of the Navy Pension Fund.” This note suggests that
the agent’s own dealing in stock transactions was intertwined with pension
disbursement payments and commissions for making purchases of stocks
and that the dividends of Columbia Bank stock were being made to the
agent instead of directly to the treasury or the fund.
There were also some cases when the commission charged was higher
than that reported above. In 1829, the agent Charles Hay was paid a
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commission of $3,376 for the purchase of $675,264.89 of stock, which
included $150,000 of U.S. Four and One-Halfs at par. Hay charged a commission of 0.5 percent, which seemed to Congress to be excessive. It was
also pointed out that the agents George Macdaniel and Benjamin Homans
had charged up to one percent on some of their asset purchases. This rate
was excessive by the standards of the market at that time. John Boyle, who
had served as the manager of the navy privateer pension fund, had never
charged a commission over the period of his transfers from 1819 to 1829.
Recognizing something was amiss, Congress relieved the navy pension fund
of these commission charges as of 1829 (ASP-NA, 2).
In summary, problems in the operation of the pension fund included
poor and inadequate accounting methods even by the standards of the day,
relatively high commissions paid to agents for purchases of assets, failure to
have dividends transferred to the fund in a timely manner, difWculties in
receiving monies from the sale of seized vessels, trading from their own
accounts by agents of the fund, slow reinvestment of cash received, and the
choice of stocks purchased by the fund. With respect to the receipt of prize
monies, in the report to Congress for 1815, the trustees wrote:
In performing this duty, the commissioners Wnd it necessary to claim the further aid
of the Legislature, not only to enable them to collect the arrearages of the prize
money, which belongs to the fund, but to secure, in future, a punctual and faithful
accountability on the part of those ofWcers who are charged with the prosecution
and sale of prizes, and the collection and distribution of the proceeds of the sales.
The imperfections of the existing laws are great, and have given rise to many abuses.
(ASP-NA, 1, no. 134).

The organization of the fund’s administration was political, with the
commissioners being presidential appointees, and there seemed to be no
efWcient operational substructure to take care of day-to-day business. The
accounts of the fund were not well managed even by the standards of the
day. These administrative problems illustrate the problems of managing a
public pension fund in the nineteenth century. Readers should consider
which if any of these problems are likely to recur if funds from the Social
Security trust fund were to be invested in publicly traded assets.

Summary and Conclusions
The U. S. navy pension fund represents the Wrst attempt in the United
States of handling a portfolio of securities to pay pensions to qualiWed
beneWciaries. Receipts into the fund were based on the value of prizes taken
by navy vessels. The prizes were liquidated, and after expenses were paid,
the cash was distributed to the ofWcers and seamen who seized the prize. In
addition, a share of the prize went into the pension fund. These receipts
were placed in a portfolio that earned returns sufWcient to pay beneWts to
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qualiWed disabled seamen and their dependents without any dependence
on tax revenues from the populace. The plan seemed idealistic for its day.
Yet it was fraught with an inherent moral hazard. The fund, should it accumulate surpluses, had Xexibility, but if revenues were insufWcient to meet
the fund’s pension obligations, the pension system had in reserve the “full
faith and credit” of the government in making up any shortfalls that might
accrue. This chapter tells a rather complex story, partially because most of
the participants, as actors and agents, either did not always understand
exactly what they were doing or they understood all too well and took
advantage of the primitive accounting standards and Wnancial oversight of
the day. There were few precedents as to how pension funds should work in
an actuarial sense, and in terms of portfolio management techniques, there
were no guidelines.
As long as the fund was receiving income and prize monies that exceeded
the outlays to eligible pensioners, the fund was autonomous and retained
any surpluses. But when the fund’s investments lost their value, or when
Congress increased pension beneWts beyond the ability of the fund to honor
the commitment, the U.S. Treasury was obliged to bail the fund out of its
predicament. Ultimately, the federal treasury—that is, taxpayers— bore the
risk of potential failure, for whatever reason, of the navy pension fund to
meet its pension obligations.
A conXict resulted from the fact that, though the Commissioners of the
fund made decisions about portfolio management, decisions concerning
eligibility for pensions and the amount awarded were the responsibility of
Congress, though the commissioners usually provided input concerning
proposed increases in pension coverage. However, their recommendations
did not prevent Congress from revising statutes to expand coverage and
increase the generosity of beneWts. Examples of such congressional actions
that were opposed by the trustees include extending beneWts to widows and
orphans and the passage of the “arrears act” that paid pensions from the
time of the occurrence of the disability.
The internal management of the navy pension fund did not enhance the
probability of success in maximizing returns from the investments. The
commissioners of the fund, including the Secretaries of the Navy, War, and
Treasury until 1832, did not seem to treat their duties in this respect as a
high priority. The operations of handling the transactions of the fund
seemed to fall to their staffs, such as they were, with the pension agents
apparently playing a key role in managing the revenues and investment decisions of the fund. There is evidence that income was not promptly reinvested in order to maximize portfolio returns, and some income received
from investments never reached the fund. The agents, though essentially
salaried employees of the fund paid to disburse pension payments, charged
commissions for their services of buying securities for the fund. Normal
commissions on stock transactions for brokers was 0.25 percent, but on
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many stock and bond purchases the agents charged from 0.50 percent to
1.00 percent. In addition, it seems that the purchases were made in the
names of the agents, to which income payments from the stock were
directed, and the agents were often negligent in remitting these dividends
to the fund. At best they were trading on their own accounts; at worst they
were embezzling from the fund.
Overall, the evidence indicates that the internal operations of the fund
were not well managed by the trustees and that these errors resulted in
reduced rates of return to the fund. The next chapter contains a review of
the investment choices made by the trustees. The choices indicate several
prominent errors in judgment associated with missed opportunities for
investments with relative high returns while the fund was purchasing rather
risky shares in local banks that ultimately defaulted on dividend payments
altogether. Eventually the values of the shares collapsed as the banks went
bankrupt. Ultimately, the fund itself collapsed as well.

Appendix
A Brief Description of the Assets Held by the Navy Pension Fund
The fund began its portfolio with U.S. government debt instruments, and the
majority of the holdings were in those various assets so long as they were
available. In 1809 the fund added private bank stock to the portfolio, some of
which was held for the complete period ending in 1842. Interestingly, the fund
never held any stock in the First Bank of the United States, which ceased
operation in 1811 when the charter was not renewed. In 1830, as U.S. government bonds became relatively scarce due to the almost complete elimination of the federal debt, the fund began adding municipal and state bonds
to the portfolio. In 1832 the fund added stock in the Second Bank of the United
States to the portfolio and was directed to buy only this asset in the future.
The period 1800 through 1842 provides some relatively easy times for
managing portfolios, but toward the end of the fund things became extremely difWcult. The federal debt was essentially retired between 1834 and
1836 and could play no major role as a dominant asset in a portfolio. Private
bank stock became depressed during the 1830s (Smith 1953). The Second
Bank of the United States was not rechartered, and between 1839 and 1842
the price of the stock fell from a premium to virtually nothing (Smith
1953). In 1841 several states either fully or partially repudiated their debt
or defaulted (English 1996; Sylla and Wallis 1998). During the later period,
when the burden of payments to pensioners was increasing, investment
opportunities for managing the fund to generate income were nil.
What follows is a very brief description of the assets held by the fund,
chronologically as they were issued or included in the portfolio of the
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fund. A signiWcant omission in the fund’s portfolio included the First and
Second Bank of the United States (prior to 1832, at least), which we include
in our descriptions. Names of assets below are as described by Bayley
(1882), Elliott (1845), and/or Homer and Sylla (1996). Whereas current
identiWcation of a Treasury security is by coupon and maturity date, in earlier times identiWcation was by coupon and issue date, since the maturity
date was usually vague, like “redeemable at the pleasure of the government.” For U.S. bonds, the dates of issue, size of the issue, date of redemption, and variations are brieXy explained.
The Sixes, Deferreds, and Threes were issued between 1791 and 1794
based on the plan of Alexander Hamilton for the original funding of the
debt incurred during the American Revolution. These bonds had no even
par value because they were based on claims against the government that
ranged from a few dollars and cents to some very large sums. Otherwise,
U.S. bonds were generally issued in terms of $100 par. Due to the odd
amounts of these early issues, market quotations were not in terms of the
price of a bond in dollars, but as percent of par.
Sixes (Sixes of 1790, or Original Sixes), $30.0 million, redeemable at the
pleasure of the government, interest of 6 percent payable quarterly, converted in 1796 to 8 percent annuities for purposes of retirement of 2 percent per annum, compound, and completely redeemed in 1818.
Deferreds (Deferred Sixes of 1790), $14.6 million, similar in all respects to
the Sixes, except that interest payments were not begun until January 1801,
converted to 8 percent annuities in 1802, redeemable on the same schedule
as the Sixes and fully redeemed in 1824.
Threes (Threes of 1790), $19.7 million, redeemable at the pleasure of the
government, interest payable quarterly, at times purchased by the Treasury
in the open market by the sinking fund, but not fully redeemed until 1832.
Stock of the First Bank of the United States was a nationally traded security,
along with the U.S. debt instruments. The bank was chartered in 1791 with
a $400 per share par value, with 25,000 shares for a stockholder par value
of $10 million, and was in existence until the charter was not renewed in
1811. This was an actively traded stock, paying semiannual dividends in January and July. Dividends were between 8 and 10 percent of par value for all years
except 1793, with an annual dividend rate of 7.625 percent, and 1794, with
a rate of 7.875 percent. Stockholders in the bank were fully reimbursed at
the time of nonrenewal of the charter. Stephen Girard, who had invested heavily in the bank, bought out the entire concern, changed the name to Girard’s
Bank, and continued the concern as a private bank until his death in 1831.
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Navy Sixes were issued in 1799 to purchase naval vessels, in the amount of
$711.7 thousand, with interest payable quarterly at an annual rate of 6 percent, redeemable at the pleasure of the government, but fully redeemed in
1806.
Exchanged Sixes were the result of a voluntary refunding in 1807 and 1808
allowing Sixes or Deferreds to be exchanged into a 6 percent bond that was
fully redeemed in 1824, but not subject to the redemption schedule of the
converted 8 percent annuities. Approximately $6 million was exchanged
from Sixes and Deferreds into Exchanged Sixes.
Eights were made up of two issues, one in 1798 redeemable in 1809 of $5.0
million, the other in 1800 redeemable in 1809 of $1.5 million. The annual
interest rate of 8 percent was paid in quarterly installments. Redemption
dates are the date of actual redemption. Actually the conditions of the bond
were that interest would cease in 1809, though the bond could remain unredeemed without interest. In fact, the bonds were redeemed in 1809.
Converted Sixes were the result of the same refunding of 1807 and 1808 of
Threes being converted to Sixes, which were quickly redeemed. Only about
$2 million was converted.
Louisiana Sixes were for the purpose of the Louisiana Purchase, issued in
1805–6 in the amount of $11.5 and fully redeemed in 1818–19.
Common stock in the commercial banks of Columbia Bank, Union Bank, and
Washington Bank began to be acquired in 1809, coincident with the redemption of the Eights. Additional purchases of bank stock were made in 1819,
coincident with the redemption of the Louisiana Sixes. These banks were
Washington, D.C. banks and were not nationally traded.
New Sixes constituted the 6 percent coupon bonds, with quarterly interest
payments, issued during the War of 1812. These issues were made up of a
series of bonds over the period 1812 through 1820. The Sixes of 1812 was
a loan of $8.1 million, redeemed in 1824. The Sixes of 1813 amounted to
$18.1 million, redeemed in 1825–27. The Sixes of 1813–14 were in the
amount of $8.5 million, redeemed in 1825–27. The Sixes of 1814 totaled
$15.4 million, redeemed in 1827–28. Sixes of 1815 were in the amount of
$12.3 million, redeemed in 1828. The Sixes of 1820 amounted to $2.0 million, redeemed in 1821.
Four and One Halfs and Fives combine several issues. The Fours of 1820,
amounting to $1.0 million, were redeemed in 1830, the Fives of 1821, of
$4.7 million, and the Four and One Halfs of 1824, $14.5 million, were
redeemed in 1834. In 1831, as these bonds were being redeemed and
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the Threes were scheduled for redemption in a couple of years, the fund
began to acquire state and municipal bonds, and was soon to be directed
to acquire only stock in the Second Bank of the United States. The Wrst
venture of the fund into state and municipal bonds was in local, as opposed
to nationally traded, assets. Later acquisitions were in bonds that were
being traded nationally.
Washington Fives were originally called City of Washington Stock and
changed names several times over the holding period. These bonds were
acquired in 1830, and in 1832 the fund acquired Cincinnati Fives.
Maryland Fives and Pennsylvania Fives were also bought in 1832, with Illinois
Sixes added in 1837. All three states defaulted temporarily on their debt:
Maryland in January 1842 with resumption in January 1848; Illinois also in
January 1842 with resumption in July 1846; Pennsylvania in August 1842
with resumption in February 1845. The fund had liquidated its position in
all these bonds prior to their temporary default.
Stock in the Second Bank of the United States was acquired in 1832 under the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Navy
restricted additional purchases by the fund to being only in this instrument.
The stock had been issued in 1817 at $100 par value per share, 350,000
shares, for a total capitalization of $35 million. These shares were traded
actively in American markets and were especially popular with European
investors. The stock paid semi-annual dividends in January and December.
The dividends were less than those paid by the First Bank, beginning at
about 3.5 percent and increasing to 7.0 percent of par value toward the end
of the charter in 1816. The fund had not included the stock in its portfolio,
and did so only when directed by the Congress. The Second Bank was not
rechartered in 1836 and failed in 1841. Those holding the stock at the end
of the charter were not, so far as we can determine, ever reimbursed for the
loss. Holdings by the U.S. Government, which had originally been 20 percent of the shares outstanding, at the end of the charter were Wnally reimbursed, but only after several years of negotiation and a schedule of annual
payments from the private version of the bank, which was called the Bank
of the United States of Pennsylvania.
Civil War U.S. Securities (see Chapter 7):
Sixes of 1881 were issued in two phases, $18.4 million in February 1861 and
$50 million in July 1861 redeemable in 1881.
6% 5-20s of 1862 were issued in 1862 in an amount of $23.7 million,
with additional amounts of $491 million in 1863 and 1864. These were
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redeemable in Wve years and due in 20 years. In 1865 there was an issue of
$125 million of 6% 5-20s of 1864 redeemable in 1869 and due in 1884,
which were sold at 102.50 for a yield of 5.42 percent. In 1865-66, $203 million of 6% 5-20s of 1865 were sold at the same price and yield, redeemable
in 1870 and due in 1885. All these bonds paid coupons on a semi-annual
basis and were tax-exempt.
Consol Sixes were issued over the period 1867-69 with three different redeemable and due dates: $333 million redeemable in 1870 and due in 1885,
$379 million redeemable in 1872 and due in 1887, and $72 million
redeemable in 1873 and due in 1888. All three issues were sold initially at
a premium with yields to redemption, respectively, of 5.16, 5.6, and 5.87
percent.

Evidence of Inefficient Management of the Navy Pension Fund
Following a long investigation by the government, and in their report of
the details from bank records, they reported their evidence. In their report
they presented tables of dividends received from Columbia, Union, and
Washington Banks for each year, 1814–28, with dividend amounts missing
entirely for all three banks for the years 1816, 1822, and 1823, and missing
from Union and Washington Banks for 1828. Their report of irregularities
is quoted here from ASP-NA, 2, no. 393, pp. 530–31.
The dividends on bank stocks which accrued in 1816 were received in that year by
the late agent (B. Homans, deceased), but were not paid over until 26th June, 1817.
Those due for the Union Bank stock, 1st April, 1823, $375.00, and for Washington
Bank stock, 30th April, 1823, $420, were received by the same agent, but not paid
over. They are charged to his account. In January, 1825, his son, B. Homans, paid
$200; the balance (except $18.23 credited for salary) still remains due.
In 1825, Charles Hay, his successor, paid $1,590.00, which was received by him in
June, 1824, for Union and Washington Bank dividends.
In 1826 Charles Hay received $1,590.00 of dividends from the same banks, which
he failed to pay over. It is charged to his account, on which there is a balance against
him of $125.78, exclusive of $3,376.32 retained by him for commissions on the purchase of stocks.
In 1827, B. Homans (son of the late B. Homans) received $840.00 for two halfyearly dividends on Washington Bank stock, ending 30th April, 1827, by order of the
Secretary of the Navy, which he omitted to pay over. The amount is charged to his
account, on which there is a balance against him of $372.87.
In 1828, George Macdaniel collected, by order of the Secretary of the Navy,
$926.00 from the agent of the Bank of Columbia, being for six months’ unclaimed
dividends due 20th March, 1823. This sum not having been paid over, is charged to
his account, on which there is a balance claimed of $1,251.08.
Two surplus dividends of $700 each, declared by the Bank of Washington in June
and August, 1817, do not appear on the books of the navy pension fund. From the
bank return, the late B. Homans received the Wrst, but to whom the second was paid
does not appear.
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These dividends not paid over and charged to the accounts of the agents
totaled $3,726.50. These were the cumulative amounts not remitted to the
fund over the period 1817 through 1828.
Notes
1. In the terminology of the day, a “stock” was actually an instrument of debt—
what we would call a “bond.”
2. The original source of the data on the fund’s transactions is ASP-NA, 1–4.
3. This research project began when the authors Wrst saw the table on page 696
in Seybert (1818) indicating that the navy pension fund was holding stock in these
private banks. The realization that in the 1800s the government was managing a
pension fund that included private equities immediately stimulated our interest,
and we began the study that culminated in this book.

